Taxpayer-Favorable Interpretation Doctrine in Polish Administrative Tax Jurisprudence
I. Introduction
Many entrepreneurs regard the principle of in dubio pro tributario as a trump card of last resort—a dispositive rule to be invoked whenever a dispute with the tax authorities appears lost. Recent jurisprudence from Poland’s administrative courts, however, reveals that this principle operates within far narrower boundaries than is commonly assumed. Five decisions rendered over the course of just several months in 2025—three by the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, hereinafter “SAC”) and two by voivodeship administrative courts (wojewódzkie sądy administracyjne, hereinafter “VAC”)—paint an unequivocal picture. Moreover, when Article 2a of the Tax Ordinance Act is read in conjunction with the principle of objective truth enshrined in Article 122 of the same statute—particularly following the much-discussed November 2025 amendment—a structural gap emerges that most taxpayers fail to appreciate, yet one that frequently proves dispositive at the merits stage.
II. The Statutory Framework: Article 2a of the Tax Ordinance
The taxpayer-favorable interpretation doctrine is codified in Article 2a of the Tax Ordinance Act (Ordynacja podatkowa). The provision mandates that irremediable doubts concerning the meaning of tax law provisions shall be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Enacted on January 1, 2016, the rule was designed to prevent situations in which ambiguous or poorly drafted legislation operates to the detriment of those subject to it.
The underlying rationale is straightforward: because the legislature bears responsibility for drafting tax statutes, it should equally bear the consequences of any resulting lack of clarity. Taxpayers ought not to suffer the effects of legislative error or normative ambiguity. So much for the theory. In practice, the doctrine’s boundaries have proven considerably more defined than its facially broad formulation might suggest—and its interplay with other procedural principles of tax law creates a picture of substantially greater complexity.
III. Three SAC Decisions Delineating the Doctrine’s Outer Limits
A. SAC Judgment of March 5, 2025 (II FSK 101/25): Fiduciary Arrangements Without Evidentiary Foundation
The case involved a licensed legal counsel (radca prawny) who sold shares in a company for approximately PLN 263,000—shares originally acquired for PLN 1,600—and subsequently failed to file the requisite PIT-8C return. The taxpayer contended that he had acted in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of a foreign principal and that, accordingly, the economic benefit accrued not to him but to the beneficial owner. Such fiduciary arrangements, however, require robust documentary substantiation.
The fundamental difficulty lay in the complete absence of evidence corroborating the existence of any fiduciary agreement. No written instrument was produced. Witnesses examined under oath denied that any such arrangement had been concluded. The sale proceeds were deposited into the taxpayer’s personal account, and no evidence of any subsequent transfer to the alleged principal was adduced. The National Court Register (Krajowy Rejestr Sądowy) identified the taxpayer—not the purported beneficiary—as the registered owner of the shares.
The SAC held in unequivocal terms that Article 2a of the Tax Ordinance requires the resolution in the taxpayer’s favor of doubts pertaining to the interpretation of legal provisions, not doubts concerning findings of fact. The taxpayer had, in effect, sought to employ the in dubio pro tributario principle to compel the authorities to accept his factual narrative notwithstanding the absence of any supporting evidence—a purpose that falls manifestly outside the provision’s scope.
B. SAC Judgment of March 6, 2025 (I FSK 1986/21): Fictitious Invoices and the Due Diligence Standard
The second case concerned a wholesale trader who had deducted input VAT on invoices issued by three limited liability companies. The tax authorities determined that these entities conducted no genuine business activity and were not the actual suppliers of the goods in question. The invoices therefore did not document real economic transactions—a textbook instance of so-called empty invoices (puste faktury).
The taxpayer’s defense rested, in part, on the contention that his business model had remained unchanged throughout the 2012–2015 period, and that courts had ruled in his favor with respect to earlier assessment periods. The SAC, however, noted a critical development: the favorable judgments for 2012–2013 had subsequently been set aside on cassation appeal, and upon remand, the complaints were dismissed. The final, binding dispositions across all relevant periods thus proved uniform—and unfavorable to the taxpayer.
The Court deemed the allegation of a breach of Article 2a to be “entirely without merit” (całkowicie chybiony), reiterating that the principle concerns doubts as to the content of tax law provisions, not doubts regarding factual circumstances.
Of particular significance to the business community, the SAC emphasized that elementary due diligence standards in the selection of trading partners are indispensable in wholesale commerce. Mere possession of invoices and contracts, absent any verification of whether the counterparty genuinely conducts business activity and is authorized to issue VAT invoices, does not constitute the conduct of a diligent entrepreneur. This constitutes an unmistakable signal that due diligence procedures ought to represent standard practice rather than the exception.
C. SAC Judgment of April 4, 2025 (III FSK 581/23): Land Registry Classifications and Zoning Conflicts
The third case involved property taxation. The complainants argued that because the local zoning plan (miejscowy plan zagospodarowania przestrzennego) designated their land for agricultural purposes, they should not be subject to the highest rate of real property tax—even though the land and buildings registry (ewidencja gruntów i budynków) classified the parcels differently. They invoked the in dubio pro tributario principle, characterizing the discrepancy between the two instruments as an irreconcilable ambiguity.
The SAC clarified that the in dubio pro tributario doctrine cannot be construed to mean that, in the event of any doubt whatsoever, the tax authorities are obligated to adopt the taxpayer’s position. The principle applies exclusively to irremediable doubts concerning the content of legal provisions. A discrepancy between the land registry and the zoning plan constitutes a question of fact and of the hierarchical relationship between data sources—not a question of statutory ambiguity.
IV. VAC Jurisprudence: Articulating a Precise Test for Doctrinal Breach
The SAC’s approach finds full confirmation at the voivodeship court level. Two VAC decisions from 2025 not only endorse the doctrinal line described above but introduce a precise analytical test for determining when Article 2a has been violated.
A. VAC Gdańsk Judgment of April 8, 2025 (I SA/Gd 91/25): Tax Treaties and the Abolition Relief
The dispute involved a Polish seafarer employed in 2019 aboard a seismic research vessel sailing under the flag of the Bahamas. The complainant initially asserted that his income fell within the scope of the Polish-Norwegian Double Taxation Convention, subsequently shifting his position to invoke the Singapore Agreement—in both cases seeking application of the so-called “abolition relief” under Article 27g of the Personal Income Tax Act.
The tax authorities established that the taxpayer was subject to no tax obligation in either Norway or Singapore. Determinative weight was given to information obtained through international tax information exchange mechanisms. The Norwegian tax administration confirmed that the complainant did not appear in its records, that the vessel was not registered in the NIS/NOR registries, and that it had not operated in Norwegian waters. The Singaporean administration, for its part, reported that the taxpayer was unknown to it, had spent only four days in Singapore, and was exempt from tax under Section 13(6) of Singapore’s Income Tax Act. Critically, the vessel was not engaged in international transport operations—it conducted seismic seabed surveys—which precluded the application of both Article 14(3) of the Norwegian Convention and Article 15(3) of the Singapore Agreement.
The complainant invoked Article 21(3) of the Singapore Agreement as a general residual clause covering “other income,” arguing that regardless of the vessel’s classification, his income arose in Singapore. The VAC rejected this reasoning, holding that the taxation of remuneration for employment aboard a seagoing vessel is expressly regulated by Article 15(3) of the Agreement and therefore falls outside the scope of the residual provision in Article 21(3).
Addressing the allegation of a breach of Article 2a, the VAC in Gdańsk articulated a proposition of considerable practical significance:
A violation of the in dubio pro tributario principle is cognizable only where the interpretive process has yielded multiple competing hypotheses, none of which is persuasive, and the authority has nevertheless selected the option unfavorable to the taxpayer.
The Court stressed that the doubts contemplated by Article 2a must be objectively ascertainable. A situation in which the authority construes a statutory provision and arrives at a determinate meaning—albeit one unfavorable to the complainant—does not give rise to “irremediable doubts.” The mere fact that a taxpayer disagrees with the authority’s interpretation does not establish the existence of an unresolvable interpretive ambiguity.
The judgment is particularly instructive for taxpayers employed on specialized vessels (seismic, research, or drilling ships), as it confirms unambiguously that vessels not engaged in international transport do not satisfy the conditions for applying maritime clauses in double taxation treaties—irrespective of the fact that they may transit between ports of different states. The proper characterization of foreign-source income and the selection of the applicable method for eliminating double taxation require, in every instance, rigorous tax analysis.
B. VAC Gliwice Judgment of September 17, 2025 (I SA/Gl 656/25): Component Importation and the Right to Deduct Input VAT
The case involved a Danish company (registered as an active VAT taxpayer in Poland) that had contracted with a Polish entity, J PL, for the supply and installation of a specialized food-industry machine. One critical component—a filtration dryer—was procured from Turkey and delivered to Poland on DAP terms. The customs duty obligation upon importation into Poland was discharged by J PL (as the entity liable for the customs debt under applicable customs and foreign exchange law), yet the right to dispose of the component as owner did not pass to J PL at the moment of importation—it remained with the Danish supplier until completion of the full machine assembly.
J PL deducted input VAT both from the customs document (component importation) and from advance-payment invoices issued by the Danish company for the supply-with-installation of the machine. The interpretive authority concluded that J PL was not entitled to deduct input VAT on the component importation because, at the time of import, the component was not being used for J PL’s taxable activities—it served the taxable activity of the Danish company performing the supply-with-installation.
The complainant invoked, inter alia, Article 2a of the Tax Ordinance, alleging inconsistency on the authority’s part: in response to one question, the authority had confirmed a nexus between the component (as part of the machine) and J PL’s taxable activities, while in response to another, it denied precisely such a nexus. The complainant further alleged a breach of the principle of legitimate expectations (zasada zaufania do organów podatkowych) and inconsistency with established individual tax ruling practice.
The VAC in Gliwice dismissed the complaint, articulating a test convergent with the Gdańsk formulation:
A violation of the in dubio pro tributario principle would arise only where none of the competing interpretive hypotheses is persuasive, yet the authority selects the option unfavorable to the taxpayer. In other words, a breach of the principle consists in a failure to adopt, from among several available interpretive hypotheses, the one most favorable to the taxpayer.
The Court appended a significant procedural observation: Article 14h of the Tax Ordinance does not mandate the mutatis mutandis application of Article 2a in proceedings concerning individual tax rulings. While this point was not dispositive, it signals a further constraint on invoking the in dubio pro tributario doctrine in the interpretive ruling context.
The judgment is also significant for the practice of international transactions involving supply-with-installation arrangements: it confirms that the mere status of a VAT taxpayer by virtue of goods importation does not automatically generate a right to deduct input VAT—it is necessary to demonstrate that the imported goods are used for the taxable activities of that particular taxpayer, not of its contractual counterparty.
V. Article 2a and Article 122 of the Tax Ordinance: A Legislative Amendment Designed to Close the Gap
The decisions surveyed above uniformly confirm that Article 2a concerns exclusively doubts as to the content of legal provisions and does not extend to doubts regarding factual determinations. A taxpayer who loses on the evidentiary plane cannot seek refuge in the in dubio pro tributario doctrine. For years, this gave rise to a persistent question: which norm protects the taxpayer when the doubts pertain to findings of fact?
A. The Principle of Objective Truth: The Pre-Amendment Regime
Until November 3, 2025, the answer lay in Article 122 of the Tax Ordinance in its original formulation—the principle of objective truth (zasada prawdy obiektywnej). The provision stipulated that, in the course of tax proceedings, the authorities shall undertake all necessary measures to establish the factual circumstances of the case precisely and to dispose of the matter. This constituted the cardinal procedural norm: the ascertainment of facts was the obligation of the tax authority, not of the party. The authority was required, on its own initiative, to gather the entire body of evidence—including, and perhaps above all, evidence favorable to the taxpayer.
This distinction is fundamental. Tax proceedings in the Polish system are inquisitorial, not adversarial, in character. The authority is not a party to the dispute—it is an entity charged with establishing the material truth. Article 122, as particularized by Article 187(1) of the Tax Ordinance (requiring the exhaustive collection and evaluation of evidentiary material), establishes the burden-of-proof framework in tax law. As the scholarly literature emphasizes, the conception of the burden of proof borrowed from civil procedure (Article 6 of the Civil Code) has no application in tax proceedings, because it is the authority—applying substantive tax law norms—that derives legal consequences from established facts, including the power to determine a tax liability at variance with the amount declared by the taxpayer.
B. The November 2025 Amendment: In Dubio Pro Tributario for Factual Determinations?
The legislature recognized the gap that scholars had identified for years and undertook to close it. By virtue of the Act of September 12, 2025 (Journal of Laws 2025, item 1417), effective November 4, 2025, the former text of Article 122 was redesignated as paragraph 1, and a new paragraph 2 was appended:
“In tax proceedings initiated ex officio, irremediable doubts concerning the factual circumstances of the case shall be resolved in favor of the party, except where: (1) the proceedings involve parties with conflicting interests, or the outcome of the proceedings directly affects the interests of other persons; (2) statutory provisions require the party to demonstrate specified facts; (3) it is precluded by an important public interest, including a vital interest of the state.”
At first blush, the amendment appears transformative. The legislature has, it seems, created a factual-sphere counterpart to the in dubio pro tributario doctrine—mandating that the tax authorities resolve irremediable doubts of fact in the party’s favor. Read against the backdrop of the 2025 case law, which consistently refused to extend Article 2a to evidentiary matters, the new paragraph 2 would appear to constitute the natural complement to the system of taxpayer protection.
C. Three Exceptions That May Swallow the Rule
The practical significance of the new Article 122(2) is, however, profoundly uncertain—owing to three statutory exceptions whose breadth may, in application, effectively consume the rule itself.
The first exception: proceedings involving parties with conflicting interests, or outcomes affecting the interests of other persons. A substantial proportion of tax proceedings in VAT matters—particularly those involving chain transactions and allegations of invoice fraud—directly affect the tax position of the taxpayer’s commercial counterparties. The question arises whether the authorities will invoke this exception in every case where factual findings in one proceeding bear upon the assessments of another entity. The scope of this carve-out is sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any proceeding involving more than one economic actor.
The second exception: statutory provisions requiring the party to demonstrate specified facts. This clause arguably opens the door to renewed burden-shifting onto the taxpayer—this time with an express statutory basis. Where a substantive tax provision conditions the application of a relief, exemption, or deduction on the satisfaction of specified factual prerequisites, the authority may contend that it is the taxpayer who must demonstrate compliance. In practice, this would encompass, inter alia, the conditions for tax exemptions, the requirements for the deductibility of business expenses, and the documentary prerequisites for related-party transactions.
The third exception: an important public interest, including a vital interest of the state. This is a general clause of the broadest possible reach. “Important public interest” is an indeterminate legal concept whose operative content will be shaped by the practice of the tax authorities and the jurisprudence of the administrative courts. In high-value disputes or in cases involving suspected tax fraud, the authority may readily invoke the public interest in combating fiscal abuse—thereby neutralizing the new rule in precisely those cases where the taxpayer’s need for protection is most acute.
D. An Additional Limitation: Proceedings Initiated Ex Officio Only
The new paragraph 2 applies exclusively to tax proceedings initiated ex officio. It therefore does not extend to proceedings commenced at the party’s request—including, notably, overpayment proceedings and proceedings for the reopening of tax proceedings. This represents a significant narrowing, given that many taxpayers initiate proceedings of their own accord in defense of their rights. In such cases, the new provision is simply inapplicable.
E. The Absence of Judicial Practice
The provision has been in force for only a matter of months, and at the time of writing, no administrative court decisions applying the new Article 122(2) have been reported. It remains unknown, therefore, how the courts will construe the individual exceptions—whether they will interpret them narrowly (as genuine exceptions to a meaningful rule) or broadly (as limiting norms that effectively render the rule a dead letter). Nor is it yet apparent how the tax authorities will deploy the “important public interest” standard, or whether the judiciary will impose rigorous justificatory requirements in this regard.
For practitioners, the implication is as follows: the new Article 122(2) represents a legislative development in the right direction, but it would be premature to treat it as a reliable instrument of defense in tax proceedings. Until a body of judicial practice crystallizes, the cornerstone of taxpayer protection in the factual sphere remains Article 122(1), read in conjunction with Article 187(1)—that is, the authority’s obligation to establish the facts of the case comprehensively and ex officio, enforced through the proactive filing of evidentiary motions and the construction of procedural objections at the appellate and judicial review stages.
VI. Practical Implications: Before and After the Amendment
The juxtaposition of Article 2a, Article 122(1), and the new Article 122(2) reveals an architecture of taxpayer protection that, following the amendment, appears more coherent on paper but continues to generate significant tensions in practice.
Where the dispute concerns statutory interpretation, the taxpayer is protected by Article 2a. If a provision is susceptible to multiple readings and no method of interpretation resolves the ambiguity, the authority must adopt the construction most favorable to the taxpayer. As the 2025 jurisprudence demonstrates, however, this condition is exacting: the doubts must be objectively ascertainable and must give rise to multiple equipollent interpretive hypotheses.
Where the dispute concerns factual findings, the taxpayer should be protected by the principle of objective truth under Article 122(1), read with Article 187(1). The authority is obligated to establish the facts comprehensively and ex officio, without shifting the evidentiary burden onto the party. A refusal to take evidence may extend only to facts already established by other evidence (Article 188 of the Tax Ordinance)—not to facts whose investigation might lead to a different assessment of the case. Following the amendment, in proceedings initiated ex officio, an additional layer of protection exists in the form of Article 122(2)—though its practical efficacy remains an open question.
A. Where Theory Diverges from Practice
The problem that predated the amendment has not disappeared—and the new provision may have only partially mitigated it. The 2025 decisions surveyed above, while declining to apply Article 2a to the factual sphere, do not simultaneously examine with sufficient rigor whether the tax authorities properly discharged their obligations under Article 122(1). The result is a gap: the taxpayer is told that Article 2a affords no protection because the problem lies in the domain of evidence, yet the practical burden of assembling that evidence continues to rest, in substance, on the taxpayer.
The fiduciary arrangement case (II FSK 101/25) illustrates this tension effectively. The SAC correctly observed that the in dubio pro tributario principle does not serve to resolve doubts of fact. The judgment simultaneously confirms, however, a discernible adjudicative tendency in which courts de facto accept a state of affairs in which the taxpayer must prove circumstances favorable to his position—notwithstanding that Article 122(1) places this obligation squarely on the authority. The tax law literature has long criticized this tendency as reflecting an unwarranted transposition into public law of the civil-law burden-of-proof concept (Article 6 of the Civil Code), which is appropriate for adversarial proceedings between co-equal parties but not for inquisitorial proceedings in which the authority applies substantive law and derives legal consequences from established facts.
The new Article 122(2) was intended to address this problem. Whether it will do so in practice depends on how narrowly or broadly the courts construe the three broad-ranging exceptions. If the administrative courts adopt a strict interpretation, treating the exceptions as genuine carve-outs from a meaningful rule, the new provision may substantially strengthen the taxpayer’s position in proceedings initiated ex officio. If, however, the exceptions are read expansively—and the track record of tax authority practice suggests this is the more likely outcome—Article 122(2) will remain a provision of largely declaratory character, effecting little change in the realities of tax proceedings.
The established practice of the tax authorities compounds the problem irrespective of the new provision’s content. In the course of tax audits and proceedings, the authorities not infrequently demand that taxpayers prove facts material to the case, produce comparative analyses and summaries, and furnish explanations of the business rationale of their transactions—that is to say, activities which, under Article 122(1), the authorities themselves are obligated to undertake ex officio. A failure to conduct a complete evidentiary proceeding constitutes a violation not only of the principle of objective truth but also of the principle of maintaining public confidence in the tax authorities (Article 121(1) of the Tax Ordinance) and of the free evaluation of evidence (Article 191 of the Tax Ordinance).
VII. Strategic Implications for Litigation
An awareness of both the limits of Article 2a and the uncertainties surrounding the new Article 122(2) carries direct tactical implications. A taxpayer whose dispute with the authority lies in the factual domain should not invoke Article 2a—the 2025 jurisprudence establishes beyond doubt that such an argument will fail. The taxpayer should instead actively enforce the authority’s obligations under Article 122(1) and Article 187(1): file motions for the taking of specific evidence, identify gaps in the evidentiary record, and—should such motions be denied—construct appellate grounds alleging violations of the principle of objective truth and the free evaluation of evidence. In proceedings initiated ex officio after November 4, 2025, it is further advisable to invoke the new Article 122(2)—even though its practical efficacy remains uncertain, the mere fact of raising the issue compels the authority to take a position and facilitates subsequent judicial review.
This is not to suggest that the taxpayer may remain passive. Although the evidentiary burden rests formally on the authority, it is in the taxpayer’s interest to identify proactively the circumstances and evidentiary means material to the case. The authority cannot, after all, take evidence of which it has no knowledge. In particular—as the scholarly literature emphasizes—the documentary obligation is most acute in the context of transactions of atypical structure: intangible services, fiduciary arrangements, chain transactions, and cross-border settlements. The taxpayer should assemble evidence contemporaneously with the transactions giving rise to tax obligations—correspondence, memoranda, meeting notes, settlement statements, and wire transfer confirmations. Engaging professional tax advisory support at the transactional stage, rather than only at the dispute stage, significantly reduces the risk of documentary gaps that prove irremediable in subsequent proceedings.
VIII. When In Dubio Pro Tributario Actually Operates
Drawing on the decisions analyzed above, one can identify with precision the conditions under which an invocation of Article 2a of the Tax Ordinance has a reasonable prospect of success.
First, the doubt must concern the content of a tax law provision—its linguistic, systemic, or teleological interpretation. Where two readings of a provision are equally defensible and no method of construction yields a determinate result, the authority must adopt the interpretation more favorable to the taxpayer.
Second, the doubts must be irremediable. This means that the authority is first obligated to attempt to resolve the ambiguity through standard interpretive methods. Only when those methods prove unavailing does the mandate to resolve in the taxpayer’s favor become operative. The principle is not an instrument of first resort—it is an ultima ratio.
Third, as the VAC decisions from Gdańsk and Gliwice make explicit, the doubts must be objectively ascertainable and must yield multiple interpretive hypotheses, none of which is persuasive. A situation in which the authority construes a provision and reaches a definitive conclusion unfavorable to the taxpayer does not constitute a breach of Article 2a—even where the taxpayer advances an alternative reading. Disagreement with the outcome of an interpretive exercise is not synonymous with the objective ambiguity of a legal norm.
Fourth—and this is the point that most frequently gives rise to misunderstanding—the doctrine does not extend to doubts concerning the factual record. Where the dispute concerns whether a given transaction occurred, whether a contract was concluded, whether goods were delivered, or whether a vessel was operated in international transport, these are evidentiary questions governed by Article 122(1) and Article 187(1) of the Tax Ordinance—and, from November 4, 2025, potentially also by the new Article 122(2), subject to the exceptions and limitations discussed above.
IX. Common Strategic Errors
Analysis of the surveyed decisions reveals a pattern of recurring errors in the litigation strategies of taxpayers.
Conflating the factual and legal spheres. Taxpayers frequently invoke Article 2a when the crux of their difficulty lies in the evidentiary domain. The proposition that “the authority must accept my version of events because the law requires doubts to be resolved in my favor” reflects a fundamental misconception. The provision addresses doubts as to the content of legal norms, not doubts as to what transpired. The appropriate basis for a defense in such cases is Article 122(1), read with Article 187(1)—an allegation that the authority violated the principle of objective truth.
Failure to maintain transactional documentation. The judgment in case II FSK 101/25 is instructive: the taxpayer relied on a fiduciary arrangement yet was unable to produce a single document evidencing its existence. Although the authority bears the ex officio obligation to establish the facts, a taxpayer without documentation forfeits the practical ability to direct the authority toward favorable evidence. This underscores the critical importance of maintaining comprehensive contemporaneous records—an area in which professional tax opinions and analyses prove invaluable at the planning stage, and where periodic legal audits serve to identify documentary gaps before they become dispositive.
Neglecting counterparty verification. The judgment in case I FSK 1986/21 offers an important lesson for all entrepreneurs engaged in large-scale commerce. The SAC confirmed that conducting business on a wholesale basis requires, at a minimum, verifying whether the counterparty is registered as an active VAT taxpayer, whether the persons executing agreements are duly authorized to act on behalf of the entity, and whether the counterparty possesses genuine logistical and operational capacity. The implementation of counterparty due diligence procedures has become a standard that the courts now expect.
Equating an unfavorable interpretation with the existence of interpretive doubts. This error is particularly pronounced in the Gdańsk and Gliwice cases. The taxpayers assumed that because their reading of the relevant provision differed from the authority’s, “doubts as to the content of the provision” necessarily existed. As both courts emphasized, however, Article 2a addresses situations in which none of the interpretive hypotheses is persuasive—not situations in which the authority has simply adopted a different construction from the one proposed by the taxpayer.
Improper argumentation in cross-border cases. The VAC Gdańsk judgment demonstrates that in disputes concerning double taxation agreements, taxpayers occasionally attempt to circumvent the unmet conditions of a lex specialis provision (such as the requirement that a vessel be operated in international transport) by invoking a general residual clause covering “other income.” Courts consistently reject this approach—a residual clause cannot serve as a vehicle for circumventing conditions expressly laid down in the treaty’s specific provisions.
Invoking Article 2a in lieu of Article 122 as the basis for procedural objections. This error is derivative of the failure to distinguish the legal and factual spheres but merits separate emphasis. A taxpayer who raises an Article 2a objection in the context of evidentiary findings not only loses that ground (as the court will reject it) but may also fail to formulate the objection that might have succeeded—namely, a violation of Article 122(1) and Article 187(1).
X. Practical Implications for Enterprises
From the foregoing analysis—and from the juxtaposition of the surveyed case law with the principle of objective truth, including the uncertainties surrounding the recent amendment—several concrete propositions emerge.
The in dubio pro tributario principle constitutes an important systemic safeguard, but it is not a universal instrument of defense in tax litigation. It operates where a statutory provision is ambiguous—not where evidence supporting the taxpayer’s position is lacking. Where the dispute concerns facts, the taxpayer is protected by a different norm—Article 122(1) of the Tax Ordinance—and, since November 2025, potentially by the new Article 122(2), although its practical efficacy, given the breadth of its exceptions and the absence of any judicial precedent, remains at this juncture an open question. The effectiveness of this protection depends on the taxpayer’s capacity to enforce the authority’s obligations actively and systematically.
Comprehensive documentation remains the foundation of tax security. Every transaction—particularly those of atypical structure, such as fiduciary arrangements, chain transactions, and cross-border settlements—should be documented in a manner that permits the reconstruction of its course and business purpose.
Counterparty due diligence procedures are not a manifestation of excessive caution but rather a standard that both the tax authorities and the administrative courts expect. Their absence may result in the forfeiture of the right to deduct input VAT—irrespective of whether the goods were in fact delivered to the purchaser.
In international transactions involving goods importation and supply-with-installation arrangements, it is essential to delineate with precision the tax roles of each participant. The mere status of a VAT taxpayer by reason of importation does not automatically generate a right to deduction—what is required is a nexus between the imported goods and the taxable activities of that specific taxpayer, understood strictly and not merely in terms of a general economic connection.
In formulating litigation strategy, it is advisable to distinguish with precision between arguments concerning statutory interpretation and arguments concerning factual findings—and to select the appropriate legal basis accordingly. An invocation of Article 2a in the context of a factual dispute will not only prove unavailing but may undermine the credibility of the entire submission. Where the authority has failed to discharge its obligation of comprehensive fact-finding, the proper ground is a violation of Article 122(1) and Article 187(1)—not Article 2a. Where, conversely, one invokes the in dubio pro tributario principle in an interpretive context, one must demonstrate that there objectively exist at least two equipollent interpretive hypotheses, neither of which is persuasive—rather than merely that one’s own reading differs from the authority’s. Where an unfavorable decision has been issued, consideration should be given to filing an appeal to the administrative court, supported by properly constructed grounds of review and, where warranted, professional legal representation.
Legal status as of the date of publication. This article is informational in nature and does not constitute legal advice.
Statutory basis: Articles 2a, 122(1)–(2), 187(1), 188, and 191 of the Tax Ordinance Act of August 29, 1997 (consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2025, item 111, as amended); Act of September 12, 2025 amending the Tax Ordinance Act (Journal of Laws 2025, item 1417). Decisions discussed: SAC of Mar. 5, 2025, II FSK 101/25; SAC of Mar. 6, 2025, I FSK 1986/21; SAC of Apr. 4, 2025, III FSK 581/23; VAC Gdańsk of Apr. 8, 2025, I SA/Gd 91/25; VAC Gliwice of Sept. 17, 2025, I SA/Gl 656/25.
Founder and Managing Partner of Skarbiec Law Firm, recognized by Dziennik Gazeta Prawna as one of the best tax advisory firms in Poland (2023, 2024). Legal advisor with 19 years of experience, serving Forbes-listed entrepreneurs and innovative start-ups. One of the most frequently quoted experts on commercial and tax law in the Polish media, regularly publishing in Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. Author of the publication “AI Decoding Satoshi Nakamoto. Artificial Intelligence on the Trail of Bitcoin’s Creator” and co-author of the award-winning book “Bezpieczeństwo współczesnej firmy” (Security of a Modern Company). LinkedIn profile: 18 500 followers, 4 million views per year. Awards: 4-time winner of the European Medal, Golden Statuette of the Polish Business Leader, title of “International Tax Planning Law Firm of the Year in Poland.” He specializes in strategic legal consulting, tax planning, and crisis management for business.
