Zondacrypto: Payment Operators Saw the Run from January. PLN 111 Million Out, PLN 86 Million In, and an Account Where Nothing Stayed Overnight
Robert Nogacki, attorney at law (radca prawny), Skarbiec Law Firm · 18 November 2026
In the first quarter of 2026, customers of the Zonda exchange withdrew PLN 111.1 million through its złoty payment operator, in 5,010 payouts, and paid in PLN 86.0 million, in 13,225 deposits. The balance of the account that funded the payouts fell from PLN 6.13 million on 2 January to PLN 92,000 on 31 March. The exchange topped it up 89 times, with PLN 15.2 million in total.
In euro the picture is the same on a smaller scale. In March, EUR 3.13 million passed through the exchange’s main account at ZEN.com, and the highest end-of-day balance was EUR 105,000.
The figures come from bank statements and operators’ daily reports held in the file of the Estonian bankruptcy proceedings. They show a run on Zonda that had been under way at least since the first business day of the year, three months before withdrawals were frozen, and that was visible, day by day, in the systems of the institutions serving the exchange.
In May, ZEN.com answered questions about its role with one sentence: we were not the operator of the exchange. That is true, and nobody claims otherwise. The question is what a payment operator saw on its own client’s account, and whether what it saw matched the model that client declared. Documents answer that question. Statements do not.
ZEN.com: an online shop that pays money out to other customers
At the end of April I described what payment operators could have read about the exchange in its public financial statements (What Madoff’s Bankers Could Teach the Customers of a Polish Crypto Exchange): an auditor’s disclaimer of opinion, liabilities to customers that could not be assigned to individuals, and a line called “use of client funds” that grew year after year.
A month later the Polish daily Puls Biznesu presented ZEN’s position (in Polish). According to a summary of that article, the fintech’s head for Europe made four points. The cooperation involved no capital, ownership or personal ties and was limited to transfers between users’ ZEN accounts and their exchange accounts. ZEN was one of six payment operators serving Zonda. It served the exchange on the same basis as online shops. And the exchange was a marginal part of its portfolio.
ZEN developed the same thought in a piece called “Facts and myths”: the shop sells the product, the operator only processes the payment.
The comparison with a shop is the best place to start, because it shows what an exchange is not. In a shop, money flows one way: the buyer pays, the seller hands over the goods and keeps the payment. The shop’s account grows. An exchange takes in money that still belongs to the customer and must be returned on demand. Its account should therefore look like a deposit: the balance matches what customers hold in złoty and euro.
Zonda’s terms of service promised exactly that: customer funds kept separate from the company’s own. The EU’s MiCA regulation turned the promise into a duty for every licensed provider. It may not use clients’ funds for its own account, and by the end of the next business day it must place them with a credit institution or a central bank, in an account separate from its own (Article 70(2) and (3)). ESMA has added that an account at an electronic money institution does not satisfy that requirement.
The scope of services also looked different from the statement. In March 2026 the exchange held at least thirteen accounts at ZEN, in four currencies. ZEN settled 2,935 customer payments for it through a gateway and an e-commerce channel, kept its main euro account, exchanged złoty into euro and executed batch payouts.
It also held the accounts on the other side of the most important transfers: the chief executive’s personal account, the account of the subsidiary Orion Software, and the account of one of three recipients who were paid day after day. Of 123 outgoing transfers from the main account, 55 went to other accounts at the same ZEN.
An online shop that hands the day’s takings to other customers each evening, and to its chief executive each morning, is not a shop. It is a benevolent fund with a very short list of beneficiaries.
Euro: EUR 3.13 million through the account, EUR 105,000 overnight
The exchange’s main euro account began March with a balance of EUR 10,000 and ended it with EUR 2,800. During the month EUR 3,133,794.39 came in and EUR 3,141,245.18 went out. The highest end-of-day balance was EUR 105,000; the median was EUR 20,000. The ratio of turnover to a typical balance is about 150 to 1. That is what a transit account looks like, not the account of an institution holding other people’s money.
| Where the money on the main account came from | EUR | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Card gateway settlements (customer deposits) | 1,089,037.58 | 35% |
| Sygnum Bank (euro from sales of USDC) | 501,037.80 | 16% |
| ZEN.COM UAB, six round transfers | 420,000.00 | 13% |
| Three companies paying in as customers | 395,000.00 | 13% |
| The chief executive, 27 March | 380,000.00 | 12% |
| Exchange of złoty deposits | 241,937.44 | 8% |
| Other | 106,781.57 | 3% |
| Where it went | EUR | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Sygnum Bank (purchases of USDC) | 889,709.00 | 28% |
| Batch payouts through ZEN (other customers) | 672,078.47 | 21% |
| The chief executive’s personal account, 14 transfers | 501,037.80 | 16% |
| Three recipients paid day after day | 347,355.11 | 11% |
| The company’s own accounts (invoices, taxes, salaries) | 300,366.08 | 10% |
| TryPay and Fenige (złoty and card payouts) | 160,660.50 | 5% |
| Orion Software, a subsidiary | 100,000.00 | 3% |
| Suppliers, the tax office and 31 small payouts | 170,038.22 | 5% |
Three things in these tables require no access to the exchange’s wallets. First, payouts to some customers were funded the same day by deposits from others. On twelve of the nineteen days on which gateway settlements reached the main account, a batch payout of a similar size left it: on 16 March, for example, EUR 90,000 came in and EUR 84,500 went out. There was no reserve from which those payouts could have come.
Second, of 66 transfers to individuals, worth EUR 802,120.37, three people received 35, or 92 percent of the amount: the chief executive, a person who gave a hotel in Switzerland as an address, and a person from Łódź. I have written about them at length (Zonda: EUR 501k to the CEO, EUR 118k to Lake Constance, EUR 230k to Łódź. The Last Month Before Withdrawals Stopped). The remaining 22 people received 31 transfers worth EUR 67,000; half of those transfers did not exceed EUR 612.
Third, on six business days on which no batch payout to customers went out at all, the chief executive received EUR 292,893.47 in total.
There is also a thread we have not analysed before. Six round amounts reached the exchange’s account from the operator itself, ZEN.COM UAB: EUR 85,000, 65,000, 50,000, 55,000, 90,000 and 75,000, EUR 420,000 in all, under one and the same reference. Three of them arrived when the account was almost empty.
On 17 March the balance stood at EUR 1,559; EUR 55,000 came in, and a batch payout of EUR 58,800 went out the same day. On 25 March: balance EUR 8,169, inflow EUR 90,000, payout EUR 44,600. On 30 March: balance EUR 3,070, inflow EUR 75,000, and the same day EUR 50,000 to the person from Łódź and a batch payout of EUR 65,200.
What these transfers were, the statement does not say. They may have been a settlement of services. They may also have been an advance or a pre-funding of payouts, in which case the operator not only saw that its client was short of money but supplied it. That is a hypothesis. One letter from ZEN, or one proof of claim lodged with the trustee, will settle it.
Złoty: payouts higher than deposits from the first day of the year
Zonda made its złoty payouts through TryPay S.A., a Polish payment institution. For each business day the operator prepared a report covering three settlement sessions, with the number and value of deposits and payouts. The reports for January, February and March 2026 are in the bankruptcy file.
| Month | Opening balance | Deposits (number) | Payouts (number) | Excess of payouts | Top-ups (number) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| January | PLN 6,133,264 | PLN 28.85m (3,521) | PLN 43.40m (1,977) | PLN 14.55m | PLN 4.29m (31) |
| February | PLN 1,158,194 | PLN 36.99m (5,752) | PLN 44.46m (1,764) | PLN 7.47m | PLN 7.46m (31) |
| March | PLN 208,369 | PLN 20.20m (3,952) | PLN 23.20m (1,269) | PLN 3.01m | PLN 3.46m (27) |
| Quarter | at the end: PLN 92,330 | PLN 86.04m (13,225) | PLN 111.07m (5,010) | PLN 25.03m | PLN 15.21m (89) |
On 2 January, the first business day of the year, PLN 5.72 million left the account in 190 items, against PLN 2.08 million of deposits. The balance fell in a single day from PLN 6.13 million to PLN 2.49 million. On 12 January, PLN 4.69 million went out in 221 items, against PLN 1.08 million coming in.
From then on the account lived from day to day. The exchange topped it up on average one and a half times a day, and in March the end-of-day balance fell as low as PLN 58,000.
The second thing the reports show is payouts shrinking while deposits held up. In January the operator executed 99 payouts a day on average, in February 88, in March 58. In the last week of March there were 35, 9, 48, 16 and 26 of them, 134 in all, against 704 deposits. On 30 March there were 16 payouts for 238 deposits. The queue at the exit grew, and the entrance worked until the last day.
On 20 April TryPay terminated its agreement with the exchange with immediate effect, citing in a stock exchange filing (in Polish) a “negative result of the risk assessment”. The reports show what such an assessment could have rested on. They also show that the operator had the same data on its screen in January.
A Swiss bank: the same currency in both directions
Sygnum Bank, a bank licensed by the Swiss supervisor, exchanged stablecoins into euro for the exchange, and euro into stablecoins. In March the exchange sold 805,300 USDC and 30 ETH there, and bought 1,009,409.91 USDC for EUR 879,452.46.
It sold round amounts in the morning, and the euro from those sales went the same day, through ZEN, to the chief executive’s account. It bought with euro from customer deposits, and the stablecoins it bought returned the same day to the exchange’s hot wallet.
The bank was therefore looking at a client that sells and buys the same asset in the same month, paying a fee each way, like a man who pawns his watch in the morning in order to redeem it in the evening with his neighbour’s money.
The other operators saw narrower slices. Fenige settled card payments: as late as 31 March it accepted 68 payments worth PLN 162,406.16 and reported a remaining deposit of the exchange of PLN 141,765.82. Tpay confirmed a balance of PLN 256,609.41 at the end of February. Clear Junction handled SEPA transfers. At AMINA Bank the exchange had four accounts with no turnover other than fees, one of them EUR 810.52 in the red.
ZEN speaks of six operators; seven institutions left a trace in the file. Dispersion is not a mitigating circumstance, however. Each institution answers for its own slice, and ZEN’s slice covered both ends of the chain in euro, just as TryPay’s covered both ends in złoty.
What happened to a customer’s deposit
A customer paid money in to buy cryptocurrency. The documents make it possible to follow what happened next to a deposit in euro.
- A card payment landed on the gateway account at ZEN: in March, 1,902 settlements worth EUR 1,109,228.54, with a median of EUR 100, on all 31 days of the month.
- From the gateway account the money moved to the main account, where it mixed with payments from companies, transfers from the operator and the chief executive’s deposit. In the exchange’s ledger, gateway deposits had not been allocated to customers since January; the balance of the technical account had grown to EUR 3.45 million.
- From the main account, three streams left on the same or the next day. The first was payouts to other customers. The second was transfers to the chief executive, group companies and the three recipients paid day after day: 40 percent of all outflows to external recipients. The third was EUR 890,000 to Sygnum to buy stablecoins.
- The USDC bought went back to the exchange’s shared wallet. In March, 5.06 million USDC left that wallet, 37 percent of it to a deposit address labelled by the block explorer as Kraken and 13 percent to Binance deposit addresses.
An exchange need not buy cryptocurrency on the outside for every deposit, because it matches its customers’ orders against one another. It must, however, hold what it owes them. According to its own reconciliation at the end of 2025, it held in its wallets 2 percent of the USDC and 3 percent of the bitcoin owed to customers (Zondacrypto: The Trustee Reached Kral. The CEO Replied in Twenty-eight Pages That Look Written by A.I.).
With cover like that, customer B’s payout could only come from customer A’s deposit. Those are the mechanics of a pyramid, whatever name a prosecutor eventually gives them.
The global standard: you may serve the exchange, you may not look away
ZEN is right about one thing: cooperation between payment institutions and crypto exchanges is a standard market model. FATF, the body that sets global anti-money-laundering standards, expressly opposes cutting a whole sector off from financial services. In the same 2021 guidance, however, it sets a condition: an institution that establishes or continues a relationship with a crypto service provider must assess the risk of that relationship and whether it can manage it.
FATF Recommendation 10 requires ongoing scrutiny of whether a customer’s transactions are consistent with what the institution knows about the customer, its business and its risk profile. The Basel Committee requires banks to run monitoring systems capable of catching unusual patterns, including transactions that make no economic sense. FATF’s red-flag indicators for virtual assets, published in 2020, include exchanging between crypto and fiat currency with no logical business explanation, even where the customer loses on fees.
Regulators have turned these principles into specifics. As early as 2018 the British supervisor wrote to bank chief executives about what it expected in relation to clients running crypto exchanges: enhanced scrutiny, an understanding of their business, checks on key individuals, and an assessment of whether the exchange itself properly vets its own customers (the FCA’s letter of 11 June 2018).
In 2024 the European Banking Authority extended its risk-factor guidelines with guidance for credit and financial institutions whose customers are crypto service providers. It has applied since 30 December 2024, that is, throughout the period described here.
After the collapse of FTX, the Financial Stability Board and IOSCO wrote into the global standard something that might have seemed obvious: an exchange must protect its clients’ assets, keep them separate from its own and reconcile the balances regularly. An institution serving an exchange therefore knows what the account of a client that meets this standard should look like.
It is also known what happens when an institution does not look. Silvergate Bank served the FTX exchange. In July 2024 it paid USD 63 million to American regulators, who alleged that it had failed to detect nearly USD 9 billion of suspicious transfers among FTX entities; it neither admitted nor denied the allegations.
The banks that served Allen Stanford’s pyramid defended themselves as ZEN does today: they provided routine services and could not have known. In February 2023, on the eve of trial, they agreed to pay the receiver more than USD 1.6 billion, TD Bank alone USD 1.205 billion, without admitting liability.
Closest to our case is the 2019 judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Singularis v Daiwa. A financial institution paid USD 204 million out of a company’s account on the instructions of its director and sole shareholder, although the circumstances called for questions about the purpose of the payments.
The court held that the institution had breached its duty of care to its own client, and awarded damages to the company in liquidation, reduced by 25 percent. It did not attribute the director’s fraud to the company. The global standard can thus be put briefly: you may serve an exchange; you may not avoid looking at its account.
What the institutions should have known
In the European Union the same principles are law, not recommendation. Directive 2015/849 requires ongoing monitoring of whether a customer’s transactions are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer and its business (Article 13(1)(d)), and an examination of the background and purpose of transactions that are unusual or have no apparent economic purpose (Article 18(2)).
Lithuania and Poland have both transposed it; in Poland the provisions are Article 34(1)(4) and Article 43 of the Act on Counteracting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz finansowaniu terroryzmu). ZEN itself describes the duties owed in high-risk sectors as enhanced transaction monitoring and ongoing risk assessment. Nobody requires a payment operator to run the exchange or to count its wallets.
This standard translates into three questions that each of these institutions could have answered from its own data.
- Does the account behave in line with the declared model? A depositary has a balance. An account through which EUR 3.13 million passes and on which EUR 20,000 stays overnight is not a deposit. A złoty account whose balance falls by 98 percent in a quarter, while payouts exceed deposits by PLN 25 million, is the record of a run.
- Do the transactions have an apparent economic purpose? Fourteen transfers to the personal account of the beneficial owner, each identical in amount to an inflow from a bank the same day, is a pattern the textbooks call a pass-through. Selling and buying the same asset at one bank in one month calls for an explanation.
- Who is on the other side? ZEN did not have to ask anyone, because on the other side were its own customers: a chief executive with an address in Monaco, the exchange’s subsidiary, and a person who gave a hotel as an address.
This argument has four limits, and they should be named. We do not know what alerts these institutions’ systems generated, what questions they put to the exchange, or whether they filed reports with financial intelligence units; there are no such documents in the bankruptcy file. The statements do not contradict ZEN’s assertion that there were no capital or personal ties.
Foreign settlements and judgments show a direction, but do not determine how a Lithuanian, Estonian or Polish court will assess the same situation. And the fact that an institution could have calculated something does not yet mean that it knew the exchange was insolvent.
What follows is this much: it had before it data on which the statutory standard requires questions to be asked, and a client in a high-risk sector should either answer those questions or lose its account. Two institutions ended the cooperation in April, after the exchange had stopped paying out. A doorman does not run the hotel. He does know who leaves at night with suitcases.
What this means for creditors
Four specific lines of action follow from these documents.
- Questions for ZEN.COM UAB and the Bank of Lithuania: what the six transfers totalling EUR 420,000 were, whether the monitoring system raised an alert on the fourteen transfers to the chief executive’s account, and when the operator first asked the exchange about the source and purpose of these flows.
- Questions for TryPay and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF): when the negative risk assessment was made, given that the operator had been reporting the data it could rest on every day since January.
- Assets of the estate. Deposits held with card operators, any reserve from gateway settlements and the balance at Tpay are the exchange’s money, which the trustee can collect without litigation. The KYC files for the accounts of the chief executive, Orion and the recipient with the hotel address are at ZEN; they can reach the trustee through the court and the prosecutors through a European Investigation Order.
- Claims against the institutions. Two routes deserve study. The first is customers’ direct claims; the statements and reports in the file are to them what the data on account 703 were to Madoff’s victims. The second is a claim by the estate. Madoff’s American trustee lost against the banks because the court attributed the founder’s fraud to the company; the UK Supreme Court in Singularis refused that attribution. Which route the law governing the exchange’s contracts with its operators leaves open is for the trustee to establish.
A payment operator does not answer for the sins of an exchange. It answers for what it saw itself and what it did about it. In the first quarter of 2026 it saw accounts into which customers paid money for cryptocurrency and from which the same money left the same day for other customers, for a bank in Switzerland and for the chief executive. A shop whose till looks like that closes after the first stocktaking. Here the stocktaking was done by the trustee.
The Zondacrypto Case
The Zondacrypto case is being examined by authorities in several countries, and no one today can predict the fate of the entrusted funds. We represent the victims and protect their position in the ongoing proceedings.

Robert Nogacki is a Polish attorney at law (radca prawny), the founder and managing partner of Kancelaria Prawna Skarbiec (Skarbiec Law Firm), which has operated continuously since 2006.
The law is equal for everyone, but the parties rarely are: on one side stands an organization with time, money, and lawyers, on the other a person with one business, one nest egg, and one life.
Clients rarely come to him with a legal problem. They come with a problem that also has a legal side: an audit that began with a single invoice, money entrusted to someone who has disappeared, a company that has to be passed on before it is too late. Most such matters are decided long before the first letter is written, in decisions made without asking and in deadlines nobody remembered. So he begins by asking how the client got here, not what the client should have done.
He advises entrepreneurs and families from more than a dozen countries, including those whose accounts the tax office has just seized and who do not know what to do tomorrow morning. He defends them in tax audits, customs and fiscal inspections, disputes with the tax authorities, and criminal tax proceedings. He represents victims of investment fraud and Ponzi schemes. He helps families set up family foundations and plan succession, so that a life’s work outlasts a single generation.
Not every case can be won. Every case can be run so that the client knows where they stand. Since 2006 he has represented the victims in the WGI case (Warszawska Grupa Inwestycyjna, the Warsaw Investment Group), one of the longest criminal cases in the history of the Polish financial market, because some things must not be left half finished, even when they take two decades. In the case of the collapsed cryptocurrency exchange Zonda (Zondacrypto, operated by BB Trade Estonia OÜ), he represents several hundred victims in the criminal investigation conducted by Poland’s National Prosecutor’s Office and in the Estonian bankruptcy proceedings.
Kancelaria Prawna Skarbiec is listed in the rankings of Poland’s largest tax advisory firms published by Dziennik Gazeta Prawna and Rzeczpospolita, and it is a four-time recipient (2015 to 2018) of the European Medal awarded by the Business Centre Club and the European Economic and Social Committee. Robert Nogacki publishes regularly, in the press and on the firm’s website, for people who have a problem rather than a law degree, because a legal opinion the client cannot understand protects only the lawyer.
He believes that the best legal advice is the kind that means the client never has to appear in court.