Active Remorse / Voluntary Disclosure Under the Polish Fiscal Penal Code

Statutory Framework, Doctrinal Controversies, and Strategic Implications of Article 16 KKS

A taxpayer who has committed an error in a tax settlement-whether through inadvertence, misinterpretation of the governing provisions, or a deliberate decision subsequently regretted-confronts a consequential choice: to await the revenue authority’s independent detection of the irregularity, or to come forward and disclose it voluntarily. Polish fiscal penal law furnishes an instrument that renders the latter course not merely prudent but affirmatively advantageous. The institution of czynny żal (voluntary disclosure), codified in Article 16 of the Kodeks karny skarbowy (Fiscal Penal Code, hereinafter “KKS”), permits the perpetrator of a fiscal offense or fiscal misdemeanor to avoid criminal liability entirely-provided that a precisely delineated set of statutory prerequisites is satisfied. The state, in effect, relinquishes its punitive prerogative in exchange for the prompt recovery of diminished public-law revenues and the illumination of the mechanism by which the law was violated.

This mechanism, however, is far from self-executing. Effective invocation of voluntary disclosure demands the simultaneous satisfaction of several conditions, each attended by interpretive nuances that prove dispositive in practice. This article undertakes a comprehensive examination of the voluntary disclosure regime-from its legal basis and underlying policy rationale, through its formal and substantive requirements, to the practical considerations that may determine whether the endeavor succeeds or fails.

 

I. The Nature and Rationale of Voluntary Disclosure

Voluntary disclosure (czynny żal) under the Polish Fiscal Penal Code constitutes an autonomous doctrinal construct, distinct from analogous institutions recognized in the general criminal law.[1] Its specificity derives from the character of the interests protected by fiscal penal law-principally the financial interest of the State Treasury, local government units, and the European Union. It is precisely this pragmatic priority that accounts for the legislature’s far-reaching willingness to forgo punishment: for the system, the recovery of diminished public-law obligations is more valuable than the imposition of sanctions upon an offender who has disclosed the transgression.[2]

As L. Wilk observes, the justification for the institution of voluntary disclosure “is to be sought in criminal policy rather than in ethical considerations. It is simply a manifestation of the calculus of losses and gains”-a figure, following O. Górniok, particularly prominent in the broadly conceived domain of economic criminal law, where the directive of proportionality serves as the foundation for both criminalization decisions and decisions to refrain from punishment.[3] Wilk identifies four dimensions of the institution: preventive (the elimination of objects subject to mandatory forfeiture), informational (the denunciation of offenders and criminal mechanisms), compensatory (the rectification of the public creditor’s loss), and-in a certain sense-retributive (the offender’s decision to accept responsibility for the act and to make reparation for the harm caused).[4]

From a doctrinal perspective, voluntary disclosure constitutes a statutory immunity clause (klauzula niekaralności). The phrase “shall not be subject to punishment” employed in Article 16 § 1 KKS signifies that satisfaction of the statutory prerequisites effects the extinguishment of punishability ex lege-mandatorily and irrespective of any exercise of discretion by the authority.[5] Critically, this does not entail the exclusion of the unlawfulness of the act or of the offender’s culpability. The prohibited act has been committed; the offender’s guilt subsists-the legislature merely renounces the penal consequences.[6] This distinction carries practical significance: an offender availing himself of voluntary disclosure does not acquire the status of an innocent person, but rather that of a person against whom fiscal criminal proceedings are not initiated, or-if already initiated-are discontinued regardless of their stage of advancement. I. Zgoliński specifies that this circumstance should produce the effect prescribed by Article 17 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with Article 113 § 1 KKS, thereby conferring upon the offender a distinctive status analogous to that of a quasi-cooperating witness (quasi-świadek koronny)-one who furnishes evidence against co-participants yet enjoys no further privileges.[7]

 

A. Historical Genesis and Statutory Evolution

The institution of voluntary disclosure is not a novelty in Polish fiscal penal law. Its origins may be traced to the former Fiscal Penal Act (ustawa karna skarbowa), where it was the subject of Article 7.[8] The construct has evolved over time; the present configuration of Article 16 KKS reflects multiple amendments, the most significant of which occurred in 2005 (revision of the wording of § 1 and adoption of impersonal formulation of the fiscal condition in § 2),[9] in 2020 (introduction of electronic filing in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic),[10] and on July 7, 2022 (addition of § 4a permitting submission of notices through the e-Tax Office portal).[11]

It should also be noted that Article 16 KKS is not the sole provision invoking voluntary disclosure in fiscal penal law.[12] Alongside it, the Code provides for: immunity attendant upon the correction of a tax return (Article 16a KKS), a specialized form of voluntary disclosure for failure to file a return within the prescribed period (Article 16b KKS), voluntary disclosure in relation to the offense under Article 67 § 3 KKS, and forms of voluntary disclosure transposed from the Criminal Code-namely, withdrawal from an attempt (Article 15 CC in conjunction with Articles 21 § 3 and 20 § 4 KKS) and prevention of consummation by a co-participant (Article 23 CC in conjunction with Articles 20 § 2 and 20 § 4 KKS). With respect to the latter category, it is noteworthy that the requirement of voluntariness is inapplicable under the KKS (Article 20 § 4 KKS).[13]

 

II. Prerequisites for Effective Voluntary Disclosure

The architecture of Article 16 KKS mandates the cumulative satisfaction of several affirmative conditions coupled with the absence of specified negative prerequisites. Failure to fulfill any single condition forecloses immunity. As systematized by I. Zgoliński, the normative structure of the institution requires, conjunctively: (a) notification of the prosecuting authority accompanied by disclosure of the material circumstances of the act and of co-participants; (b) observance of the prescribed form of notification; (c) payment in full of the outstanding public-law obligation diminished by the act, or surrender of objects subject to forfeiture; and (d) the non-occurrence of the negative prerequisites set forth in Article 16 §§ 5 and 6 KKS.[14]

 

A. Notification: Self-Denunciation and Identification of Co-Participants

The first and foundational condition is notification of the prosecuting authority of the commission of a fiscal offense or fiscal misdemeanor. Such notification comprises two elements: self-denunciation-that is, disclosure of one’s own act and its material circumstances-and denunciation of persons who participated in its commission.[15]

The concept of “material circumstances” (istotne okoliczności) is not defined by statute, thereby investing it with an evaluative character. Prevailing doctrine, following P. Kardas, G. Łabuda, and T. Razowski, holds that the term refers to circumstances corresponding to the statutory elements (znamiona) of the relevant type of prohibited act,[16] encompassing a description of the mechanism of commission, identification of documents and other evidence employed, and specification of the magnitude of the diminution or the exposure to diminution of the public-law obligation.[17] L. Wilk emphasizes that “there are no precise metrics for [the required] materiality” and that “the assessment of whether disclosed circumstances are material rests with the procedural authority, not with the offender.”[18] The prudent minimum, accordingly, comprises disclosure of circumstances that, taken together, satisfy the definitional elements of the prohibited act as set forth in the Special Part of the Fiscal Penal Code. The information conveyed must, moreover, be truthful and comprehensive-concealment of circumstances within the offender’s knowledge vitiates the notification.[19]

The obligation to identify co-participants is absolute within the scope of the offender’s knowledge. Both Zgoliński and A. Soja observe that failure to disclose even a single co-participant of whose involvement the offender was aware precludes invocation of the institution, and that the burden of demonstrating the absence of such knowledge rests upon the notifying party.[20] The concept of “co-participants” (osoby współdziałające) is understood in criminal law doctrine as coextensive with the forms of criminal participation-co-perpetrators, instigators, and accessories. L. Wilk, invoking M. Cieślak, notes that the broader view extending this concept to receivers of proceeds (paserzy) lacks justification.[21]

By contrast, the offender’s motives and incentives are immaterial. As early as 1968, the Supreme Court held that “the motives actuating the perpetrator of a fiscal offense in notifying the authorities charged with prosecution are irrelevant.”[22] The offender may be impelled by remorse, fear of punishment, economic calculation, or the advice of a tax advisor-each such motivation is legally indifferent.

Furthermore, the requirement of voluntariness is inapplicable to any manifestation of voluntary disclosure under fiscal penal law. This position is now uniformly accepted in the literature.[23] J. Sawicki identifies Article 20 § 4 KKS as the normative basis for this conclusion: since that provision expressly eliminates the voluntariness requirement with respect to forms of voluntary disclosure transposed from the Criminal Code, it would be difficult to maintain that the same qualification does not extend to the autonomous fiscal construction of Article 16 KKS.[24] L. Wilk supplements this reasoning with a practical argument: the question whether a given instance of voluntary disclosure was voluntary will invariably present a difficult factual inquiry, and determinations of this nature may well exceed the institutional competence of the financial officers of the preliminary proceedings authorities who, as a rule, decide in practice whether the prerequisites of voluntary disclosure have been met.[25]

 

B. Personal Scope: Standing to File Voluntary Disclosure

Self-denunciation may be undertaken by any person who has committed a prohibited act, irrespective of the form of criminal participation-whether as principal, co-principal, instigator, or accessory.[26] The 2005 amendment to Article 16 § 1 KKS, which replaced the pronoun “whoever” (kto) with the noun “perpetrator” (sprawca), constituted-as Wilk observes-merely a drafting adjustment to align the provision’s wording with the title of Chapter 2 of the KKS, which refers to the perpetrator sensu largo.[27] The impersonal formulation of the fiscal condition in § 2 (“has been paid”) confirms that this condition may also be fulfilled by a person bearing liability as a perpetrator pursuant to Article 9 § 3 KKS.[28]

Prevailing doctrine holds that where an act has been committed by more than one person, only the individual who first notifies the prosecuting authority may avail himself of the institution. Multiple co-participants may benefit from voluntary disclosure only if they submit their notification simultaneously (jointly).[29] The strategic implications are considerable: in multi-party scenarios, time constitutes a critical variable, and a delay of even a single day may deprive a co-participant of the prospect of immunity.

 

C. Form of Notification

The Fiscal Penal Code prescribes three permissible forms for notification of voluntary disclosure. Written notification on paper need not satisfy the formal requirements of a procedural document-it suffices that its content unequivocally establishes that the notifying party has committed a specified prohibited act.[30] The submission may not be anonymous and must contain the offender’s personal data, address, and signature.[31]

Whether notification may validly be submitted by an attorney-in-fact (pełnomocnik) remains doctrinally contested. T. Grzegorczyk permits this possibility,[32] whereas L. Wilk argues for its inadmissibility, reasoning that the authority must be able to ascertain the scope of the notifying party’s awareness regarding the circumstances required by Article 16 § 1 KKS.[33] J. Sawicki proposes a compromise: an attorney-in-fact merely physically delivers the written notification signed by the offender-a function that in substance constitutes the role of a messenger (nuntius) rather than an agent sensu stricto.[34] The skeptical view regarding the admissibility of submission by representative must be regarded as dominant.[35]

Electronic notification, introduced by the amendment of March 31, 2020, in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, and supplemented as of July 7, 2022, by the possibility of submission through the e-Tax Office (Article 16 § 4a KKS), requires that the document be authenticated by a qualified electronic signature, a trusted signature, or a personal signature.[36] This represents a significant procedural facilitation, reducing barriers to access-particularly when time is of the essence. Oral notification on the record requires the offender’s personal appearance and the making of a declaration to the protocol prepared by the prosecuting authority.

As J. Sawicki aptly observes, purely formal requirements ought to play a secondary role in the context of notification and should not be permitted to condition its effectiveness.[37] An approach demanding compliance with all formal requirements applicable to procedural documents finds no rational justification and disregards the essence of an institution predicated upon the offender’s act of disclosing his transgression.

 

D. Competent Authority

Notification is to be submitted to “an authority charged with prosecution” (organ powołany do ścigania). Under the KKS, these comprise: financial preliminary proceedings authorities (the head of the tax office, the head of the customs and fiscal office, and the Head of the National Revenue Administration), non-financial preliminary proceedings authorities (the Border Guard, the Police, the Internal Security Agency, the Military Gendarmerie, and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau), and the public prosecutor. As A. Soja notes, this catalogue is exhaustive-authorities not enumerated in the relevant provisions of the KKS lack competence to receive notification under Article 16 KKS.[38]

The prevailing view in the literature holds that notification may be submitted to any authority charged with prosecution, irrespective of subject-matter, functional, or territorial jurisdiction.[39] Each such authority is obligated to accept the notification and-where it lacks jurisdiction-to transmit it to the competent authority. A significant qualification, articulated by T. Grzegorczyk and A. Soja, is that for purposes of assessing the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure, it is the state of knowledge of the competent authority that is determinative-if that authority already possessed a clearly documented awareness of the act, submission of the notification to an incompetent authority will not rescue the offender.[40]

 

III. The Fiscal Condition: Payment of the Public-Law Obligation

The second essential prerequisite is the discharge “in full of the outstanding public-law obligation diminished by the committed prohibited act” within the period designated by the competent preliminary proceedings authority (Article 16 § 2 KKS). This condition materializes only in cases where the act has occasioned an actual diminution of a public-law obligation.[41] The period is designated by the authority-until such designation, the offender is not obligated to make payment and benefits from the immunity clause (Supreme Court judgment of October 24, 1988, V KRN 226/88).[42] In designating the period, the authority must have regard to the directive set forth in Article 14 KKS.[43]

The condition is formulated impersonally (“has been paid”), signifying that the obligation may be discharged by a party other than the offender[44]-subject to the limitations of Article 62b of the Tax Ordinance Act, pursuant to which payment of tax by a person other than the taxpayer is permissible only to a limited extent.[45] The obligation must be due and payable (wymagalna)-an obligation that has been extinguished by limitation, remitted pursuant to Article 67a of the Tax Ordinance Act, or restructured into installments (where the installment due date has not yet elapsed) does not qualify.[46] Where the act does not consist in the diminution of an obligation and forfeiture is mandatory, the offender surrenders the objects in natura or pays their monetary equivalent (excluding prohibited objects under Article 29(4) KKS).

 

IV. Temporal Boundaries of Effective Voluntary Disclosure

The moment of commission of the act marks the commencement of the period within which the offender may submit notification. The terminal moment is prescribed by Article 16 § 5 KKS, which identifies two circumstances that render the notification ineffective.

Clearly documented awareness on the part of the prosecuting authority (Article 16 § 5(1) KKS). This concept is linked-as Wilk observes-to the existence of a document, though what is salient is not so much the type of document (whether protocol or memorandum) as whether it records the information with sufficient clarity, “i.e., at a minimum sufficient to identify the elements of the offense.”[47] “Documentation” is not to be equated with “proof”-it suffices that the document furnishes a basis for the initiation of at least preliminary verification procedures.[48] The absence of information in the authority’s IT system (for example, the non-appearance of a return in the tax office registry) does not, by itself, constitute clearly documented awareness of the prohibited act.[49] The concept does, however, encompass information derived from operational-intelligence activities.[50] Zgoliński emphasizes that the custodian of the documented awareness must be the prosecuting authority within the meaning of the KKS-an offender who submits notification before another entity has informed the prosecuting authority of the act therefore retains immunity.[51]

Commencement of an official action (Article 16 § 5(2) KKS). The action must be directed toward the detection of the fiscal delict falling within its substantive scope-as Wilk underscores, it is solely the purpose of the audit that is relevant: “it must be aimed at the detection of a fiscal delict.”[52] A tax audit concerning VAT does not, therefore, preclude voluntary disclosure in respect of income tax. Zgoliński and Soja add that the entity conducting the official action within the meaning of Article 16 § 5(2) KKS must be exclusively a prosecuting authority-a customs-fiscal audit conducted by another entity does not foreclose voluntary disclosure.[53] A critical “safety valve” obtains: if the official action did not furnish grounds for the institution of proceedings, the offender regains the capacity to submit voluntary disclosure upon its formal conclusion.[54]

 

V. Subject-Matter Scope and Personal Exclusions

Voluntary disclosure applies to all fiscal offenses and fiscal misdemeanors-without subject-matter limitation.[55] It encompasses both substantive (diminution-based) and formal offenses. The application of cumulative concurrence of statutory provisions does not constitute a negative prerequisite, although-as Soja notes-where the act simultaneously satisfies the elements of an offense under the general criminal law (for instance, invoice falsification under Article 270a CC), the offender may be held liable under the Criminal Code notwithstanding an effective fiscal voluntary disclosure.[56]

The exclusions are exclusively personal in character (Article 16 § 6 KKS) and concern: the directing perpetrator, the ordering perpetrator, the organizer or leader of a criminal group (unless notification is made jointly with all members), and the agent provocateur. As both Skowronek and Wilk summarize, the exclusions target, in general terms, persons whose role in the commission of the act was of an initiating, organizing, or directing nature.[57]

The solution embodied in Article 16 § 6(3) KKS merits particular attention: it permits the organizer or leader of a criminal group to avail himself of voluntary disclosure on the condition that notification is made jointly with all members of the group. Wilk takes the view that the requirement of collective disclosure should refer to persons participating in the criminal structure at the time of notification, rather than to all persons who have ever participated therein-a position at variance with the more restrictive view advanced by Grzegorczyk.[58]

 

VI. Voluntary Disclosure Distinguished from Tax Return Correction (Article 16a KKS)

Alongside the classical voluntary disclosure regime, Article 16a KKS establishes a distinct institution: immunity for an offender who has filed a legally effective correction of a tax return and has discharged the outstanding obligation. Return correction requires neither notification of the authority nor identification of co-participants-it operates as a mechanism of “silent rectification.” While procedurally simpler, its scope of application is narrower: it encompasses exclusively acts connected with defective tax returns. Voluntary disclosure under Article 16 is the broader institution, covering acts unrelated to returns and requiring affirmative denunciation. The election between the two mechanisms demands precise legal qualification of the act. An erroneous assessment-for instance, the assumption that a return correction suffices when in fact the act necessitates a full voluntary disclosure-may result in the forfeiture of the opportunity for immunity, particularly if the authority acquires clearly documented awareness in the interim.

 

VII. Comparative Perspective

The institution of voluntary disclosure is not unique to the Polish legal system. Analogous mechanisms operate in numerous jurisdictions: in Germany-the Selbstanzeige; in the Netherlands-the transactie; in Switzerland-the one-time disclosure of concealed income; in the United Kingdom-the HMRC self-disclosure procedures; and in the United States-the IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program.

The significance of these comparisons extends beyond academic curiosity. The judgment of the CJEU of February 11, 2003, in Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 (Gözütok and Brügge), established that the ne bis in idem principle under Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement applies also to proceedings resulting in the extinguishment of the public prosecutor’s right of prosecution-including procedures in which the prosecutor, without judicial participation, definitively terminates criminal proceedings upon the suspect’s fulfillment of specified conditions. In light of that ruling, a question arises-warranting further de lege ferenda analysis-regarding the potential ne bis in idem effect of Polish voluntary disclosure: if effective submission of notification leads to a definitive non-subjection to punishment, this may carry implications for the cross-border efficacy of the institution in another EU Member State in relation to the same act.

 

VIII. Practical Considerations

Expedition of action. Each day of delay augments the risk that the authority will acquire awareness of the act or will commence an official action. Voluntary disclosure filed the day before the initiation of an audit is effective; filed the day after, it may no longer be so.

Completeness of information. The notification should convey the full picture of the situation as known to the offender: a description of the mechanism of the act, identification of documents, the magnitude of the diminution, and all known co-participants. Concealment of any information in the offender’s possession engenders the risk of ineffectiveness.

Evidentiary preservation. It is advisable to retain proof of the submission of notification-a copy of the written submission with confirmation of dispatch or receipt, a printout of the electronic confirmation, or a copy of the protocol.

Concurrent discharge of the obligation. Although the authority designates the payment period, voluntary settlement of the arrears at the time of filing the notification strengthens the offender’s position and expedites the process.

Analysis of concurrence with the general criminal law. Voluntary disclosure extinguishes punishability solely in respect of the fiscal delict. Where the same act simultaneously satisfies the elements of an offense under the general criminal law (for instance, invoice falsification under Article 270a CC), the offender may be subject to liability under the Criminal Code notwithstanding an effective fiscal voluntary disclosure.[59] An assessment of this risk is indispensable prior to filing the notification.

Professional legal counsel. Evaluation of the prerequisites of voluntary disclosure requires analysis of the factual circumstances against the backdrop of precise statutory conditions and their rich doctrinal interpretation. An erroneous assessment may not only defeat immunity but furnish the authority with additional inculpatory evidence.

 

IX. Conclusion

Voluntary disclosure under Article 16 of the Fiscal Penal Code remains one of the most pragmatic instruments in the Polish legal system. It reconciles the fiscal interest of the state with the protection of the individual who demonstrates a readiness to remedy the consequences of the transgression. The institution is universal in its subject-matter scope, does not require voluntariness, and applies to all forms of criminal participation-with the exception of enumeratively specified personal exclusions. Its effectiveness hinges upon surgical precision: the date of filing the notification, the completeness of the information, the correct identification of the competent authority, and the discharge of the obligation in full and within the prescribed period. In cases of significant financial magnitude, a professional legal assessment prior to filing the notification is not a formality-it is a condition of rational risk management.

The increasing complexity of the regulatory environment-from automatic exchange of tax information, through cross-border corporate structures, to new reporting mechanisms for crypto-assets (DAC8)-means that the temporal window for effective voluntary disclosure is progressively narrowing. A taxpayer contemplating resort to this institution should treat time as a critical resource and act preemptively, before data from automatic exchanges of tax information reach the tax authorities. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that voluntary disclosure affords protection exclusively against fiscal penal liability-it does not eliminate potential liability under the general criminal law, a consideration that warrants separate analysis before any decision to disclose.

 

X. Voluntary Disclosure and Third-Party Liability (Article 9 § 3 KKS)

Particular attention in the context of voluntary disclosure is warranted by the liability of persons managing the economic, and in particular the financial, affairs of another entity (Article 9 § 3 KKS). This provision extends the scope of fiscal penal liability to persons who are not formally taxpayers but who in fact conduct the financial affairs of a company, foundation, or other organizational unit-most commonly members of management boards, chief financial officers, and chief accountants.

Such persons bear liability “as a perpetrator”-which means that they may also avail themselves of the voluntary disclosure institution on the general terms.[60] The impersonal formulation of the fiscal condition in Article 16 § 2 KKS (“has been paid”) confirms that the obligation may be discharged by the entity obligated under financial law, and not exclusively by the person filing the voluntary disclosure. In practice, this means that a company’s chief accountant who files voluntary disclosure may expect that the company (as taxpayer) will settle the tax arrears-and that such settlement will satisfy the condition of Article 16 § 2 KKS.

Two limitations, however, must be observed. First, if the person under Article 9 § 3 KKS acted at the direction of an ordering perpetrator (for example, the president of the management board), the latter may not avail himself of voluntary disclosure by reason of the exclusion under Article 16 § 6(2) KKS-even if it is he who initiates the disclosure. Second, under the Tax Ordinance Act, payment of tax from the resources of a person other than the taxpayer is subject to the limitations of Article 62b, which may complicate satisfaction of the fiscal condition in certain configurations.[61]

 

XI. Voluntary Disclosure, Professional Secrecy, and Compliance Obligations

An offender intending to invoke voluntary disclosure must account for potential conflict with obligations arising from professional secrecy-particularly where the act was committed in the course of discharging professional duties within a company, and notification requires the disclosure of information constituting trade secrets or data subject to confidentiality clauses.

The Fiscal Penal Code provides no exemption from the obligation to disclose the material circumstances of the act on grounds of professional or commercial secrecy. An offender who withholds material circumstances by invoking confidentiality clauses risks the ineffectiveness of the voluntary disclosure. At the same time, disclosure of confidential information to the prosecuting authority within the framework of voluntary disclosure may generate civil liability toward the entity whose secret has been compromised. This constitutes a further domain in which professional legal analysis prior to filing the notification is indispensable-it is necessary to weigh the penal risk (forfeiture of immunity) against the civil risk (breach of confidentiality clauses).

In the context of corporate compliance, it is worth observing that many compliance programs provide for internal reporting procedures (whistleblowing). These procedures do not, however, substitute for voluntary disclosure under Article 16 KKS-a report of irregularities through an internal compliance procedure does not constitute notification of a prosecuting authority and does not activate the immunity clause. The offender must submit a separate notification to the competent authority, independently of any steps taken through corporate compliance mechanisms.

 

XII. Appendix: The Interest Question in the Discharge of the Obligation

One of the most frequently encountered practical questions in the application of voluntary disclosure is whether payment “in full” of the outstanding public-law obligation encompasses late-payment interest. This question merits separate treatment by reason of its practical significance and-as L. Wilk himself acknowledges-the absence of an unambiguous legislative resolution.[62]

In favor of inclusion of interest, T. Grzegorczyk argues that although the definition in Article 53 § 27 KKS indicates that the diminished obligation is the amount from whose payment or declaration the obligor has abstained, under tax law an unpaid tax becomes an arrear upon which late-payment interest accrues, and payments that do not cover the entirety of these sums are allocated ex lege proportionally between the arrear and the interest (Article 55 § 2 of the Tax Ordinance Act), with the result that a payment corresponding solely to the tax itself will not in fact discharge the full diminished obligation.[63]

The opposing position is presented by L. Wilk. The statutory definition of a diminished public-law obligation in Article 53 § 27 KKS does not encompass interest. The term “tax” within the meaning of Article 53 § 30 KKS carries the meaning ascribed to it by the Tax Ordinance Act, and no provision of that Act equates “tax” with “interest.”[64] Wilk concedes that a purposive interpretation-taking account of the enforcement function of fiscal penal law-may favor a broader reading, but emphasizes that “a purposive interpretation yields a broader result than a strictly literal one, and the latter operates in the offender’s favor.”[65] This position is endorsed by Zgoliński, who states directly that “the acceptance of the proposition that the offender is obligated to pay the obligation together with interest would constitute an expansive interpretation to the offender’s detriment, impermissible in fiscal penal law.”[66]

In practice, the revenue authorities generally adopt the position that interest is included.[67] An offender seeking certainty of effectiveness should therefore pay the amount together with interest-treating this as an element of risk management. Should, however, the authority refuse to recognize voluntary disclosure solely on account of the non-payment of interest, there exist sound grounds for challenging such a decision in proceedings, invoking the literal interpretation operating in the offender’s favor.

 

XIII. Voluntary Disclosure and Voluntary Submission to Liability (Articles 17–18 KKS)

Voluntary disclosure is not the only mechanism for the consensual resolution of a fiscal penal case. The Fiscal Penal Code also provides for voluntary submission to liability (dobrowolne poddanie się odpowiedzialności, Articles 17–18 KKS)-an institution that, notwithstanding certain functional similarities, differs fundamentally from voluntary disclosure.

Voluntary submission to liability requires judicial approval and consists in the payment of a fine in an amount corresponding at least to the minimum penalty prescribed for the given act, together with payment of the diminished public-law obligation (if the act consisted in a diminution) and surrender of objects subject to forfeiture or payment of their equivalent. It is thus a more onerous institution than voluntary disclosure-the offender pays not only the obligation but also a fine. In return, the resulting judgment is not entered in the National Criminal Register as a conviction.

Voluntary submission to liability may be employed in situations where voluntary disclosure is no longer available-for instance, after the commencement of an official action by the prosecuting authority or after the authority has acquired clearly documented awareness. It constitutes, as it were, a “second tier” of protection: when voluntary disclosure arrives too late, voluntary submission to liability may still be accessible.

The election between the two institutions depends upon the stage of the proceedings: voluntary disclosure is deployed before the authority takes action; voluntary submission to liability-after the institution of proceedings. In practice, the optimal strategy is to act at the earliest possible stage-that is, to file voluntary disclosure.

 

XIV. Special Cases

A. Voluntary Disclosure for Formal Offenses

Not all fiscal offenses consist in the diminution of a public-law obligation. Some are formal in character-for example, failure to file a return within the prescribed period, deficient maintenance of accounting records, or non-compliance with record-keeping obligations. In the case of such acts, the fiscal condition of Article 16 § 2 KKS does not materialize (there is no obligation to discharge), and voluntary disclosure is limited to satisfaction of the denunciatory condition: notification of the authority accompanied by disclosure of material circumstances and co-participants.[68] This simplifies the procedure, but does not eliminate the remaining prerequisites-in particular, the negative prerequisites of Article 16 § 5 KKS.

 

B. Voluntary Disclosure and Limitation

Voluntary disclosure may be filed only in relation to an act whose punishability has not been extinguished by limitation. Limitation of punishability (Article 44 KKS) renders the act entirely non-prosecutable-and consequently eliminates the need for recourse to voluntary disclosure. Conversely, if the public-law obligation is time-barred under tax law (Article 70 of the Tax Ordinance Act), it is not “due and payable” within the meaning of Article 16 § 2 KKS,[69] which likewise modifies the conditions for application of the institution. The intersection of tax-law limitation with the continued punishability of the act may give rise to complex legal configurations requiring case-specific analysis.

 

C. Plurality of Acts

An offender who has committed several distinct prohibited acts may file voluntary disclosure in respect of each of them separately, provided that all prerequisites are satisfied with respect to each act. The effectiveness of voluntary disclosure is assessed independently for each act-ineffectiveness in respect of one act (for instance, because the authority already possesses clearly documented awareness) does not preclude effectiveness in respect of another act as to which the negative prerequisites do not obtain.

 

XV. Voluntary Disclosure in the Era of Automatic Exchange of Information

The contemporary realities of international tax cooperation-the DAC mechanisms (automatic exchange of tax information), CRS (Common Reporting Standard), and FATCA-mean that the revenue authorities dispose of an ever-expanding volume of information regarding taxpayers’ cross-border financial transactions. Such information may constitute “clearly documented awareness” within the meaning of Article 16 § 5(1) KKS, thereby contracting the temporal window for effective voluntary disclosure.

A taxpayer who has conducted transactions through foreign financial institutions subject to automatic exchange of information should take into account that data regarding his accounts and transactions may reach the Polish revenue authorities through regular exchanges-typically with a one-year lag. If the authority receives such data and documents them in a manner permitting identification of the elements of the offense, voluntary disclosure submitted after that point will be ineffective.

In practice, this means that the window for effective voluntary disclosure in cross-border matters narrows with each successive exchange mechanism. An offender intending to avail himself of this institution should act swiftly-before data from automatic exchanges reach the competent authority and are processed thereby.

 

Volutary disclosure – Further Reading

The Ineffectiveness of Voluntary Disclosure Under Polish Fiscal Penal Law

Legal status: January 1, 2026.

This article is informational in character and does not constitute legal advice. In individual matters, consultation with an attorney-at-law (radca prawny) or an advocate (adwokat) specializing in fiscal penal law is recommended.

[1] See J. Sawicki & G. Skowronek, PRAWO KARNE SKARBOWE 89–90; V. Konarska-Wrzosek, in V. Konarska-Wrzosek, T. Oczkowski & J. Skorupka, PRAWO I POSTĘPOWANIE KARNE SKARBOWE 162–63 (Warsaw 2010).

[2] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 1 (5th ed. Warsaw 2021); see O. Górniok, PRAWO KARNE GOSPODARCZE 7.

[3] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 1 (5th ed. 2021).

[4] Id.

[5] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 1 (2d ed. WKP 2021); A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 3 (LEX/el. 2026); see also F. Prusak, Zaniechanie ukarania sprawcy, in SYSTEM PRAWA KARNEGO vol. 11, at 50–51 (A. Marek ed., Warsaw 2014).

[6] G. Skowronek, in KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 3 (1st ed. 2020); cf. Z. Siwik, SYSTEMATYCZNY KOMENTARZ DO USTAWY KARNEJ SKARBOWEJ. CZĘŚĆ OGÓLNA 125 (Wrocław 1993).

[7] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 3 (2d ed. 2021) (following Grzegorczyk).

[8] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 1 (2d ed. 2021).

[9] Ustawa z 28.07.2005 r. o zmianie ustawy—Kodeks karny skarbowy oraz niektórych innych ustaw [Act of July 28, 2005 Amending the Fiscal Penal Code and Certain Other Acts], Dz.U. No. 178, item 1479.

[10] Ustawa z 31.03.2020 r. o zmianie ustawy o szczególnych rozwiązaniach związanych z zapobieganiem, przeciwdziałaniem i zwalczaniem COVID-19 [Act of March 31, 2020], Dz.U. item 568, as amended.

[11] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 1 (LEX/el. 2026); Ustawa z 8.06.2022 r. [Act of June 8, 2022], Dz.U. item 1301, as amended.

[12] See generally G. Bogdan, Specyfika czynnego żalu w prawie karnym skarbowym, in PAŃSTWO PRAWA I PRAWO KARNE. KSIĘGA JUBILEUSZOWA PROFESORA ANDRZEJA ZOLLA vol. 2 (P. Kardas, T. Sroka & W. Wróbel eds., Warsaw 2012).

[13] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (5th ed. 2021).

[14] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (2d ed. 2021).

[15] G. Skowronek, in KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (1st ed. 2020).

[16] P. Kardas, G. Łabuda & T. Razowski, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, at 300 (Warsaw 2017).

[17] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 11 (LEX/el. 2026).

[18] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 4 (5th ed. 2021).

[19] See Wyrok SA w Poznaniu [Poznań Court of Appeals judgment] of Feb. 7, 2002, II AKa 16/02, OSA 2002/9, item 69.

[20] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (2d ed. 2021); A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 12 (LEX/el. 2026); K. Czichy, Czynny żal w prawie karnym skarbowym—uwagi de lege ferenda, PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY 2016/5.

[21] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 4 (5th ed. 2021) (following Cieślak; contra S. Baniak, PRAWO KARNE SKARBOWE 66 (2005)).

[22] Wyrok SN [Supreme Court judgment] of Oct. 9, 1968, II KR 140/68, OSNPG 1969, No. 4, item 49.

[23] See G. Łabuda & T. Razowski, Czynny żal w Kodeksie karnym skarbowym, 2 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 101 (2007); L. Wilk, SZCZEGÓLNE CECHY ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI ZA PRZESTĘPSTWA I WYKROCZENIA PODATKOWE 508 (Katowice 2006); J. Sawicki, ZANIECHANIE UKARANIA JAKO ELEMENT POLITYKI KARNEJ W PRAWIE KARNYM SKARBOWYM 143 (Wrocław 2011); A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 7 (LEX/el. 2026).

[24] J. Sawicki, Znaczenie czynnego żalu w prawie karnym skarbowym, 6 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 40–41 (2013).

[25] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (5th ed. 2021).

[26] G. Skowronek, in KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (1st ed. 2020) (following Grzegorczyk); A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 8 (LEX/el. 2026).

[27] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 11 (5th ed. 2021).

[28] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶¶ 8, 11 (5th ed. 2021).

[29] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 8 (LEX/el. 2026).

[30] J. Sawicki, Znaczenie czynnego żalu w prawie karnym skarbowym, 6 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 38 (2013); T. Grzegorczyk, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, at 85–86 (LEX 2009).

[31] G. Skowronek, in KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 4 (1st ed. 2020).

[32] T. Grzegorczyk, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, at 85 (LEX 2009).

[33] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 5 (5th ed. 2021).

[34] J. Sawicki, Znaczenie czynnego żalu w prawie karnym skarbowym, 6 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 37–38 (2013).

[35] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 13 (LEX/el. 2026) (“The position permitting submission of voluntary disclosure by an attorney-in-fact appears highly controversial.”).

[36] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (2d ed. 2021).

[37] J. Sawicki, ZANIECHANIE UKARANIA JAKO ELEMENT POLITYKI KARNEJ W PRAWIE KARNYM SKARBOWYM 138–39 (Wrocław 2011).

[38] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 15 (LEX/el. 2026); G. Łabuda & T. Razowski, Czynny żal w Kodeksie karnym skarbowym, 2 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 105 (2007).

[39] J. Sawicki, ZANIECHANIE UKARANIA, supra note 37, at 139–41; T. Grzegorczyk, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, at 86 (LEX 2009); contra A. Bartosiewicz & R. Kubacki, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY 2010. PRZESTĘPSTWA I WYKROCZENIA PODATKOWE ORAZ DEWIZOWE 142 (Warsaw 2010).

[40] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 16 (LEX/el. 2026); T. Grzegorczyk, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, at 86 (LEX 2009).

[41] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (2d ed. 2021).

[42] Wyrok SN [Supreme Court judgment] of Oct. 24, 1988, V KRN 226/88, OSNPG 1989, No. 6, item 74.

[43] J. Sawicki, Znaczenie czynnego żalu, supra note 24, at 47; T. Grzegorczyk, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, at 85 (LEX 2009).

[44] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 8 (5th ed. 2021).

[45] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 21 (LEX/el. 2026).

[46] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶¶ 18–19 (LEX/el. 2026).

[47] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 6 (5th ed. 2021).

[48] Id.

[49] A. Legutko-Kasica, Czynny żal w kodeksie karnym skarbowym, 4 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 140–41 (2012); J. Sawicki, Znaczenie czynnego żalu, supra note 24, at 41–44.

[50] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (2d ed. 2021); A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 24 (LEX/el. 2026).

[51] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (2d ed. 2021) (following G. Łabuda, in P. Kardas, G. Łabuda & T. Razowski, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16 (2017)).

[52] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 6 (5th ed. 2021) (following Grzegorczyk).

[53] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (2d ed. 2021); A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 26 (LEX/el. 2026); G. Łabuda & T. Razowski, Czynny żal, supra note 38, at 106–09.

[54] T. Grzegorczyk, Instytucja czynnego żalu w ustawie karnej skarbowej i w projektach nowej u.k.s., PALESTRA 1996/9–10, at 54; G. Skowronek, in KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 5 (1st ed. 2020).

[55] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 10 (5th ed. 2021); A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 4 (LEX/el. 2026).

[56] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 4 (LEX/el. 2026); S. Baniak, PRAWO KARNE SKARBOWE 109 (Kraków 2005).

[57] G. Skowronek, in KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 6 (1st ed. 2020); L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 10 (5th ed. 2021).

[58] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 10 (5th ed. 2021); contra T. Grzegorczyk, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, at 86 (LEX 2009).

[59] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 4 (LEX/el. 2026).

[60] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶¶ 8, 11 (5th ed. 2021).

[61] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 21 (LEX/el. 2026).

[62] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 7 (5th ed. 2021) (“It is regrettable that the legislature, having defined so many concepts in the KKS, did not unambiguously determine the meaning of the requirement to pay the diminished public-law obligation in full.”).

[63] T. Grzegorczyk, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, at 85 (LEX 2009); accord A. Bartosiewicz & R. Kubacki, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY 2010, at 143–44 (Warsaw 2010).

[64] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 7 (5th ed. 2021); see also L. Wilk, Niektóre zagadnienia związane z uiszczeniem uszczuplonego podatku przez sprawcę czynu zabronionego, 4 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 38–41 (2003).

[65] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 7 (5th ed. 2021).

[66] I. Zgoliński (ed.), KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 2 (2d ed. 2021); accord A. Legutko-Kasica, Czynny żal w kodeksie karnym skarbowym, 4 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 135–36 (2012); P. Lewczyk, Problematyka odsetek w postępowaniu karnym skarbowym, 2 PROKURATURA I PRAWO 121 (2014).

[67] L. Wilk, in L. Wilk & J. Zagrodnik, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ art. 16, ¶ 7 (5th ed. 2021).

[68] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶ 4 (LEX/el. 2026).

[69] A. Soja, in J. Błachut, G. Keler & A. Soja, KODEKS KARNY SKARBOWY. KOMENTARZ AKTUALIZOWANY art. 16, ¶¶ 18–19 (LEX/el. 2026).